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Abstract  
In line with accepted decision making theory, individuals engage in rational decision making. 
Decisions made under conditions of bounded rationality may have serious adverse consequences. 
Employees making decisions on behalf of their employer are often faced with situations where perfect 
and complete information is not available, and time is limited. Under such conditions, we posit that 
employees will make decisions that are increasingly bounded. At its most extreme neither time nor 
information is available to make a decision and rational decision making, bounded or not, reaches its 
limits. Many authors suggest that this is the point at which improvisation takes place. Although opinion 
in the literature is mixed regarding the efficacy of improvised decisions, we argue that improvised 
decisions place the organisation at considerable risk and as a consequence are undesirable. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
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Improvisation has been presented as a useful framework to explain how employees make decisions 
when immediate action is necessary and there is no time to collect, assimilate and process additional 
information about the object of the decision. Encouraging employees to improvise in these 
circumstances is commonly seen as having the potential to provide benefits to the organisation. Many 
arguments espousing the benefits of improvisation are founded on the idea that action is better than 
inaction. By way of example, in the service recovery situation, an immediate response to an irate 
customer may be required (Cunha, Rego and Kamoche, 2009), and allowing employees to improvise 
decisions/actions facilitates this process, as well as empowering and hence motivating employees to 
deliver heightened levels of customer service.  
 
One aspect of improvised decisions that has not been addressed in any substantive way in the 
literature is the inherent danger of inconsistencies arising from such decisions and their associated 
actions. From an organisational perspective having employees display behaviours that are consistent 
with the brand promise is crucial to the successful positioning of service brands in particular. We 
assert that improvised employee decisions and their associated actions towards customers are 
inconsistent across employees and may be inconsistent with brand promises. In contrast to the 
dominant view in the marketing literature we suggest that improvisation is not a desirable approach for 
organisations to facLOLWDWH HPSOR\HHV¶ VSHHG\ UHVSRQVH WR FRPSOH[ RU XQIDPLOLDU VLWXDWLRQV ZKHUH
decisions and actions converge. Improvisation, by its very nature, is undesirable for organisations and, 
rather than being encouraged, should be prevented as much as possible. We will argue that the 
adoption of existing economic and cognitive psychology theories of decision making provide a more 
useful framework for organisations wishing to ensure that they are responsive to their customers in a 
manner that is consistent with the brand and which provides customer interactions which are more 
consistent across all employees.  
 
Improvisation 
&XQKD HW DO  GHILQH LPSURYLVDWLRQ DV ³WKH FRQFHSWLRQ RI DFWLRQ DV LW XQIROGV GUDZLQJ RQ
DYDLODEOHUHVRXUFHV´2WKHUVVXJJHVWWKDWLPSURYLVDWLRQLV³XQSODQQHGEHKDYLRXU´&KHODULXHWDO
µµLQWXLWLRQJXLGLQJDFWLRQ LQDVSRQWDQHRXVZD\¶¶ &URVVDQDQG6RUUHQWLS ³VLPXOWDQHRXV
FUHDWLRQ DQGH[HFXWLRQRI SODQV´ 0RRUPDQDQG0LQHU D 7KHVH GHILQLWLRQV RIIHU VRPHXVHIXO
insights into the domain of improvisation. It is apparent that improvisation is action oriented. Both 
Chelariu et al, and Crossan and Sorrenti highlight the impromptu nature of improvised decisions,  
Moorman and Miner highlight the convergence of the improvised decision with its enactment. These 
two themes are reflected by Weick, 1993a,b) who asserts that improvised decisions are made under 
conditions of resource constraints, i.e. limited resources (usually time and/or information). These 
elements of improvisation are summarised by Cunha et al (2009), who suggest that there are four 
elements to improvisation. 1) it is deliberate (the result of intentional efforts on behalf of the 
organization), 2) it is extemporaneous (it cannot be planned for), 3) it occurs during action (improvising 
staff do not stop to think about what the best response to a problem would be and can only judge its 
correctness in hindsight) and 4) it has a bricolage component (improvised actions draw on available ± 
not necessarily optimal resources).  
 
We believe that this generally accepted view of improvisation is fundamentally flawed and it is, in fact, 
no more than a form of rational decision making.  
The elements of improvisation have many similarities with economic theories of decision making, in 
particular the ideas of rational decision making and bounded rationality (see for example Rachlin, 
Green, Kagel and Battalio 1976). Briefly, the idea of rationality is based in economic theory and 
suggests that the rational approach to a decision is to weigh all alternatives on all relevant dimensions 
and then to select the one with the highest weight. This maximises the subjective expected utility to 
the deciVLRQPDNHUDQGLQWKLVZD\WKHµEHVW¶GHFLVLRQLVPDGHIRUDPRUHFRPSUHKHQVLYHUHYLHZRI
rational decision making and its limitations see Arrow 1986). Perfect rationality assumes that the 
decision maker has infinite resources (time, information and cognitive ability) to make a decision. 
However, this is certainly not the case under normal circumstances where the decision context is said 
to be constrained (there are not infinite resources with which to make a decision). In a situation of 
resource constraints, decision makers are encouraged to use "fast and frugal" heuristics to make 
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decisions. This has long been understood in the consumer context. For example Markin (1979) 
reviewed thinking at that time to show that consumers do not process large amounts of information, 
even when making high risk decisions. Rather, decisions are made based on a limited set of 
environmental cues (information), processed using rules or heuristics grounded in previous learning. 
In the management context Hmieleski and Corbett (2006) point to the use of heuristics in 
entrepreneurial decision making.  
Improvisation occurs during action 
Cunha et al. base the idea of successful improvisation on the decision maker learning appropriate 
responses to situations. The foundation of the Cunha et al. argument is that employees who succeed 
in meeting customer needs experience a sense of accomplishment and greater job satisfaction, 
reinforcing the improvised behaviours and motivating employees to continue to serve the organization 
by serving its customers. Thus successful improvisations become part of the overall service delivery 
process. This idea of learning from experience is also found in jazz improvisation theory (e.g., 
Kamoche et al., 2003), which shows that the ability to improvise is often embedded in experiential 
knowledge and skill (Miner et al. 2001) and is helped by employees drawing on unconscious 
expertise, tacit knowledge (Leybourne, 2006b), forms and memory (Zack, 2000). Thus it appears that 
previous experience may help the individual to develop "fast and frugal" heuristics on which to base 
decisions, and suggests further similarities between improvisation and decision making under 
conditions of bounded rationality. 
Improvisation is extemporaneous  
The need for rapid decision making is also examined in the cognitive psychology literature, and 
improvisation appears to have a similar conceptual domain to dynamic decision making (Gonzales 
2004; Benson and Beach 1996 and Rastergary and Landy 1993). Dynamic decision making (DDM) 
comprises multiple, interdependent decisions that are made under severe time constraint in a 
continuously changing environment (Gonzales 2004). Conventionally, this is a context in which it is 
suggested that employees have to improvise. Cognitive psychology suggests that when individuals 
make decisions in dynamic situations, they limit the amount of information they process before making 
a decision so that they can perform the task as quickly as possible. Again this suggests close 
conceptual similarity between improvisation, bounded rational decision making and dynamic decision 
making. The process of limiting the information that is processed is based in previous learning. 
Operant conditioning would suggest that the most salient attributes of a decision context have been 
previously learned, and probable outcomes of behaviours and their consequences known. Behaviours 
likely to elicit positive outcomes are more likely to be adopted than those yielding uncertain or negative 
outcomes.  
Improvisation is the result of intentional efforts on behalf of the organization 
Observation from practice suggests that organisations often put in place measures to ensure that 
HPSOR\HHV¶ UHVSRQVHV WR FXVWRPHUV DUH FRQVLVWHQW ERWK DFURVV HPSOR\HHV DQG ZLWK WKH VWDWHG
strategy of the firm. Notwithstanding debates about scripting of services versus the need to 
personalise, it appears that many employers seek to imbue their employees with decision heuristics 
that help to extend the limits of rational decision making by increasing the resources of the decision 
maker. This suggests that employers attempt to obviate the need for employees to improvise 
decisions. Reducing the level of improvisation, and increasing the consistent application of decision 
rules to customer contact situations, reduces the risks associated with improvisation to levels that are 
ZLWKLQDFFHSWDEOHULVNSURILOHVDVVRFLDWHGZLWKWKHILUPV¶REMHFWLYHV 
Improvisation Bricolage 
We suggest that individuals making decisions in one role (as a consumer) are unlikely to adopt a 
different process of decision making in other roles that they enact. Consequently, we argue that 
employees, faced with the need to make fast decisions, will do so by applying heuristics that they have 
already learned provide suitable outcomes in the same or similar situations.  
This is fully consistent with Cunha et al (2009), who suggest improvised decisions draw on available, 
but not necessarily optimal, resources. However, we suggest that decisions that are made using pre-
learned rules are not truly impURYLVHGUDWKHUWKH\DUHPHUHO\µIDVW¶ 
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:H DOVR DUJXH WKDW WKH DVVHUWLRQ WKDW LPSURYLVDWLRQ LV µHPSRZHULQJ¶ DQG VR DFWV DV DPRWLYDWLRQDO
force for employees is questionable. Making decisions with limited resources (time, cognitive and 
information) is inherently stressful for those required to do so. Cognitive dissonance theory would 
assert that individuals are driven to reduce uncertainty and as such decisions with uncertain outcomes 
constitute a stressful context, one which the individual will seek to avoid. Given the need to make and 
enact improvised decisions simultaneously, and the uncertainty of the outcome of an improvised 
decision, one would expect improvisation to constitute a form or role stress and so will be de-
motivating. Currim and Sarin (1983) point to the role of risk in the decision making process and 
suggest that risk influences behaviour, especially when decisions are made under constrained 
conditions. For improvisation to be empowering, employees should not perceive risk in the decision 
that they improvise. However, given the inherent uncertainly in the outcome of an improvised decision, 
risk (of either supervisor or customer dissatisfaction) is inherent and empowerment may be 
compromised. Obviating the necessity to improvise will reduce the stress experienced by decision 
makers.  
 
In order to conceptually differentiate improvisation from decision making under conditions of bounded 
resources, or in dynamic environments, we conceptualise improvised decision making (improvisation) 
as a special case of decision making under conditions of bounded rationality, where the resource 
constraints are at their most extreme, and rational (or rationalised) decision making has reached its 
limits (i.e. no time, relevant experience or information). This is similar to the approach taken by 
Hmieleski and Corbett (2006) who assert that improvisation occurs when both resource constraints 
and novelty are high. In this context improvising individuals do not have meaningful heuristics on 
which to base their decisions, and do not have the time to engage in extensive cognitive problem 
solving.  
This is shown in Fig 1.  
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Figure 1: Improvisation and Decision Making 
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Improvisation and Organisational Risk 
Figure 1 shows the relationship between resources and decision making. With infinite resources with 
which to make a decision, perfectly rational decisions result. Strategy implementation requires that all 
employees are aware of the corporate strategic directions and implement them consistently (e.g. King 
and Grace 2005). Under conditions of perfect rationality, employees would be completely aware of 
strategic imperatives, have all other relevant information and have sufficient time and infinite cognitive 
resources to make decisions. Consequently perfectly rational decisions, consistent with organisational 
strategy will be made and the individual will experience minimal stress in the decision making process. 
This is not the reality in most decision contexts. In the context of simultaneous decision making and 
action time is severely constrained, information and cognitive resources may be somewhat 
constrained depending on the individual and the decision context. In order to make functional 
decisions under these circumstances, employees apply their cognitive resource to the available 
information, in the form of appropriate response heuristics that they have learned in previous decisions 
to simplify the decision making process. Here the decisions are bounded somewhat by information 
and cognitive resources but the decision maker has sufficient experiences from which to draw 
previously successful decision rules in order to make reasonable decisions. As employees have 
different levels of experience in the role to which the decision pertains some variation in decision 
outcomes occurs, and employees experience higher levels of stress than in the perfectly rational 
decision making context. As the decision becomes increasingly bounded, less relevant information is 
available to the decision maker. In increasingly bounded decision contexts employees are forced to 
draw on ever more distant experiences (those learned in dissimilar contexts or those that have been 
only marginally successful in the past). The application of heuristics based on less relevant 
experiences might results in increased variability in decision outcomes and higher stress experienced 
during decision making as the likely outcomes become increasingly opaque. At its most extreme, the 
decision maker is faced with a totally new problem or situation, and does not have any meaningful 
experience on which to base decision heuristics. Cognitive dissonance theory would suggest 
indecision, inaction or deferral to a higher authority at this point. However in the context of a severely 
time constrained decision this is not an option and the decision maker is forced to improvise. As a 
consequence, there is a high probability that decision makers will experience elevated stress in the 
decision making process and due to variations in individual responses to this decision stress decisions 
across the workforce will be very variable. It is this variability that poses considerable risk to the 
organisation as conformance to strategic goals is likely to be compromised.  
 
As a consequence, we propose that improvisation, as decision making under extreme resource 
FRQVWUDLQWVLVLQKHUHQWO\EDGQRWEHFDXVHWKHGHFLVLRQPD\EHµLQFRUUHFW¶EXWEHFDXVHWKHRXWFRPHRI
the decision making process (over many employees) is subject to greater variance. This increases the 
risk to the firm. Variable decisions mean that the firm is not in control of the implementation of its 
strategic directives and may not achieve its desired outcomes (see Hope and Pate, 1988). We also 
propose that improvisation, by its very nature, is a stressful event. It is characterised by the need to 
make an immediate decision with no relevant information, and no cognitive framework on which to 
base the decision. It also has uncertain outcomes for the individual as WKH ULVN RI PDNLQJ D µEDG¶
decision is unknown (Balachandra 2005). This is likely to increase the level of stress experienced by 
an improvising decision maker.  
 
Future Research  
In order to test the proposed framework it is necessary to examine employee decision making under 
conditions of severe time and information constrains (improvisation). One context in which this might 
occur is the service recovery situation. We propose to examine the heuristics that employees apply to 
these service recovery decisions, and explore what happens when existing heuristics are exhausted. 
To achieve this an experimental design incorporating service recovery role play will be employed. 
Previous research suggests that training, with time to examine all decision alternatives, helps 
employees to rehearse decisions and to extend their decision heuristics (Gonzales 2004). This 
extends the limits of rational decision making and reduces the need to improvise. Consequently, 
variability in decision outcomes and decision making stress should be reduced after appropriate, 
structured training.  
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In the experimental design, decision variability and employee stress in unfamiliar decision contexts will 
be tested prior to- and post training. Stress can readily be measured using physical devices, such as 
heart rate monitors, and variability in decision outcomes will be measure using a-priori evaluation 
criteria.  
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